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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to consider 
Plaintiffs' claims regarding the illegality of Defendants' 
conduct? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs' 
appeal of the trial courts' denial of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and for a new trial on 
the issues of mistake and illegality? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs' 
appeal on the issue of whether the trial judge improperly based 
his decision on his physical inspection of the property at or 
around the time of trial where the appearance of the property at 
that time differed greatly from its appearance at the time the 
alleged misrepresentations occurred? 
JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this Court to review the decision of the 
Court of Appeals dated March 14, 1990 is invoked pursuant to Rule 
46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
Section 10-9-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
Section 57-5-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
Section 57-5-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
Section 6-6-1 Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, 
Utah (1984). 
Section 6-3-8 Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, 
Utah (1984). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. Sanders, appeal 
from a judgment allowing Defendants to foreclose upon their Trust 
Deed and awarding them money damages. Plaintiffs then filed a 
Motion for a New Trial and renewed their Motion to Amend Their 
Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented at Trial. The 
Court denied that Motion on October 26, 1988. Plaintiffs appeal 
both those Orders. 
In March of 1979, Defendants Ovard purchased two acres of 
property from Mr. Layne Newman. (Trial Transcript, (hereinafter 
"Tr.") 58, Trial Exhibits 12-D and 13-D) That transaction was 
accomplished by two trust deeds, each covering one acre. (Tr. 
2 06) At approximately the same time, Mr. Ovard and Mr. Newman 
submitted a request for a variance to the City of Draper. (Tr. 
61, Trial Exhibit 7-P) Their request was accompanied by a plat 
showing five acres divided into a three-acre lot (Mr. Newman's) 
and a two-acre lot (Mr. Ovard's). (Tr. 61, Trial Exhibit 6-P) 
The City of Draper granted Mr. Ovard a variance to build one home 
on his two acre lot subject to three conditions. (Tr. 61, 64, 
Trial Exhibit 8-P) Mr. Ovard then constructed his home on one 
acre of the two-acre parcel. 
In July of 1982, the Sanders purchased the home built by 
Martin Ovard in Draper, Utah and only one acre of the lot . (Tr. 
151) Thereafter, Plaintiffs decided to make inquiries into 
purchasing the other acre for themselves. During this period of 
time, the Defendant knew that the two acres had not been legally 
subdivided. (Tr. 60) 
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Joseph Sanders contacted Fred Hale, the realtor who had sold 
them their residence regarding the remaining acre. (Tr. 153) 
They examined the listing agreement and a plat map which had been 
supplied by the Defendants1 realtor and agreed to make an offer 
on the property owned by the Ovards. (Tr. 153) The amount of 
their offer was based in part upon the asking price for other 
parcels of the same approximate size which could be built upon. 
(Tr. 156, 157) Plaintiff paid $26,000 for the land. (R. 201, 
Trial Exhibits 1-P, 2-P and 3-P) 
Subsequent to this time, Plaintiff discovered that the 
unimproved parcel he had purchased from the Defendant and the 
parcel upon which his residence was situated, had been illegally 
subdivided by the Defendants. (Tr. 17) Mr. Sanders further 
learned that both parcels were subject to a variance which 
imposed certain conditions upon the land and that the City of 
Draper would not issue a building permit for the unimproved 
property. (Tr. 168) 
Plaintiffs filed this action in the Third Judicial District 
Court and the matter was tried before the Honorable Frank G. Noel 
on October 2 6 and 27, 1987. At the conclusion of those 
proceedings, Plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings to conform to 
the evidence of illegality. Judge Noel took the matter under 
advisement until he had an opportunity to physically inspect the 
property. (R. 142) Judge Noel did not rule on the motion until 
hearing Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial. 
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The Court issued a memorandum opinion on December 4, 1987, 
finding in favor of the Defendants on their Counterclaim and 
finding no cause of action on Plaintiffs' Complaint. (R.142-143) 
The Court's ruling sets forth certain observations about the 
property which were not consistent with the appearance of the 
property when purchased by the Plaintiffs in 1982. (R. 142-143) 
The ruling did not address the claim of illegality. 
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for a New Trial and to Amend 
the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence (R. 222) The trial 
court denied both of those Motions and Plaintiffs now appeal 
seeking a new trial. (R. 255) 
On March 13, 1990, arguments were entertained by a panel of 
the Court of Appeals on Plaintiffs' appeal pursuant to Rule 31 of 
the Unah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A decision was rendered 
two days later denying Plaintiffs' appeal and Plaintiffs now seek 
a Writ of Certiorari and review of that decision. 
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
I. THE EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF THE 
ILLEGALITY OF DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT AND 
A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs argued that there was sufficient evidence of 
illegality introduced at trial to support a finding that the 
issue was tried to the trial court with the consent of 
Defendants. A Motion to Amend was made at the end of Plaintiff's 
case. Other jurisdictions have held that the defense of 
illegality may be raised for the first time on appeal. Mitchell 
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v, American Savings and Loan Assfn. 593 P.2d 692, 693-94 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1979); Greer v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 674 
P.2d 1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). Regardless of when the issue 
was first raised, an important question of law is at issue 
regarding Plaintiffs defense of illegality. 
The illegal conduct of Defendants in selling the unimproved 
one-acre parcel to the Plaintiffs is clear from a review of the 
record below in connection with a number of state and local 
statutes. 
In the trial, Defendant Ovard acknowledged that his property 
was not legally subdivided. (Tr. 60) There had been previously 
submitted to Draper City a plat seeking to divide the five acre 
parcel into five one acre lots. 
Q. ...Could you give me an approximate date when you 
became aware that the plat had been submitted? 
A. Well, before I built the house, I found out it hadn't 
been approved as a subdivision. 
(Tr. 60) Despite the fact that it was an illegal "subdivision11, 
the land was sold to the Plaintiffs as a legal lot. 
The laws are clear that the sale to Sanders was illegal. 
§ 57-5-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), requires that a 
division of property into lots be approved by the governing body 
of the city or town in which the property is located. Further, 
§ 57-5-5 makes it a misdemeanor violation to sell a lot before it 
is acknowledged, filed and recorded. Mr. Ovard never had his 
division of the two acres described in the variance acknowledged, 
filed or recorded with the appropriate local authorities. 
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Another applicable statute is § 10-9-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended) which reads: 
Whoever being the owner or agent of any land 
located in a subdivision within any area for 
which a major street plan has been adapted by 
the planning commission and the legislative 
body, except for land located in a recorded 
subdivision, transfers or sales such land 
without first preparing a subdivision plat 
and having such plat approved by said 
planning commission and legislative body and 
recorded in the office of the county recorder 
shall be guilty of a violation of this act 
for each lot so transferred or sold and the 
description by metes and bounds in the 
instrument of transfer or other document used 
in the process of selling or transferring 
shall not exempt the transaction from such 
violation, except that in subdivisions of 
less than ten lots, land may be sold by metes 
and bounds, without necessity of recording a 
plat if all the following conditions are met: 
(a) The subdivision layout shall have been 
first approved in writing by the planning 
commission, (b) The subdivision is not 
traversed by the mapped lines of a proposed 
street as shown on the official map or maps 
of the municipality, and does not require the 
dedication of any land for street or other 
public purposes, and (c) If the subdivision 
is located in a zoned area, each lot in the 
subdivision meets the frontage, width and 
area requirements of the zoning ordinance or 
has been granted a variance form such 
requirements by the board of adjustment, 
(emphasis added). 
This statute again makes it illegal to sell "lots" which 
have not been approved by the appropriate planning commission and 
recorded with the county recorder. It does set forth three 
exceptions to that general rule, however, those are not 
applicable to the action taken by Mr. Ovard. 
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It is clear that Ovard's sale of the unimproved acre of land 
and the adjoining acre with the home situated thereupon violated 
these statutes as well as Draper ordinances. His illeaal conduct 
is sufficient to justify a finding in favor of the Plaintiffs or 
to hold a new trial on this issue. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO DISCRETION 
TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND 
THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
This Court and the Court of Appeals have interpreted Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) as a mandatory requirement that the 
trial court grant leave to amend pleadings to conform to the 
evidence to include issues tried by the express or implied 
consent of the parties. The issues of mistake and illegality 
were tried with the implied consent of the Defendants. Lloyd's 
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 509 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Poulsen v. Poulsen. 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983). 
At the trial in this matter, evidence was received without 
objection relating to the illegality of Mr. Ovard's division of 
his property into two one-acre parcels. Utah law is clear about 
the legality of the division and subsequent sale of the Ovard 
property. § 57-5-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). That 
statute sets forth the procedural requirements for legally 
subdividing property and it was clear from the testimony at trial 
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that Mr. Ovard did not comply with these requirements. That 
chapter of the Utah Code continues in § 57-5-5 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended) which reads: 
If any such person shall sell any lot so 
platted according to such plat before it is 
made out, acknowledged, filed and recorded as 
aforesaid, such person shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor for each lot which he shall sell. 
The evidence introduced at trial clearly established that 
Ovard sold an unapproved lot to Sanders in violation of this 
statute. In addition, there are also Draper City ordinances 
which were violated by Mr. Ovard's division of his property into 
one-acre parcels. § 6-6-1 C; § 6-3-8 Land Use and Development 
Regulations of Draper, Utah. 
Based upon the evidence introduced at trial and the judicial 
interpretation of Rule 15(b), the trial court had no discretion 
over whether to grant leave to amend. The decision of the Court 
of Appeals denying Plaintiffs1 appeal on this point is directly 
contrary to this interpretation of that rule. 
III. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S VIEW OF THE 
PROPERTY AS A BASIS FOR HIS 
DECISION WAS IMPROPER. 
On appeal, Plaintiff raised an important question of law 
concerning the propriety of the Judge basing his decision on his 
view of the property as it appeared at the time of trial. 
Plaintiffs believed that his view would be used to put the 
evidence he had heard at trial into some sort of physical 
context. Instead, as was apparent from his opinion, he relied 
upon the layout of the property in making his decision that the 
Plaintiffs should have been alerted to potential access problems 
to their property. 
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Moreover, the court feels the Plaintiffs did 
not exercise due diligence at the time of the 
purchase to determine the status of the 
property. The court is also of the opinion, 
after having viewed the property, that due to 
the location of the property, the road 
leading from the main paved road ending in 
what appears to be somewhat of a cal-de-sac 
(sic), and under the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person should 
have been alerted that there may be access 
problems associated with the back parcel of 
property that should be investigated, 
(emphasis added) 
flThe power of the court to order a view should be exercised 
with caution. The trial judge should be satisfied that 
conditions at the time he views the premises are substantially 
the same as they were at the time that the claim arose. He must 
also be satisfied that a personal inspection by him will be fair 
to all parties concerned and is reasonably necessary to do 
justice between them." 4 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law (Chadbourn rev. 1972) S 1169 (quoting from Greenberg v. 
Waterbury, 117 Conn. 67, 73-74, 167 A. 83, 85 (1933)). The 
concerns expressed in this treatise reflect the situation which 
occurred in the present case. The premises involved had a very 
different appearance when viewed by the judge then when viewed by 
the Plaintiffs as potential purchasers six years prior. 
The Court of Appeals erred in not seating aside the decision 
of the trial court where it was based in part upon his view of 
the property which had changed considerably in appearance in the 
intervening six years. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court has a great deal of discretion in deciding 
whether to grant a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The 
Petitioners herein have set forth the special and important 
reasons which justify the issuance of a Writ in this case. 
The most important reason is the existence of the defense of 
illegality for the Plaintiffs. The record clearly establishes 
that the Ovards violated numerous state and local statutes with 
their division of a two acre lot into two one-acre parcels and 
the subsequent sales of those parcels. The Defendant admitted 
the illegal "subdivision" in his testimony. 
Petitioners also contend that the trial court lacked 
discretion on whether to allow Plaintiffs to amend their 
pleadings to conform to the evidence of illegality and mistake 
which was introduced at trial. Furthermore, it was error for the 
trial judge to base his decision on his view of the property 
without first ascertining the changes in the property's 
appearance in the six years since Plaintiffs1 cause of action 
accrued. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners ask that this Court grant them a Writ 
of Certiorari and review the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
this case. 
DATED THIS / y day of /^/(AA^ , 1990. 
f. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
COMES NOW, Frederick N. Green, attorney for the Plaintiffs 
in the above-entitled action, and hereby certifies that the has 
served Thomas N. Crowther with four (4) copies of the Plaintiffs' 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari by mailing true and correct 
copies thereof to Thomas N. Crowther of the firm of Parsons & 
Crowther, attorneys for Defendants, at 455 South 300 East, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this lo day of 
Api/j 1 . 1990. 
\2$L DATED THIS lQ day of April, 1990 
GREE 
GREEN 
Attorney for P la int i f f s 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS yC^J/X^^ 
00O00 v 
Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. 
Sanders, 
Plaintiff and Appellants, 
v. 
Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard, 
Ben F. Ovard, Helen T. Ovard 
and Jax Hayes Pettery, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
v. 
Joseph D. Sanders, Cheryl M. 
Sanders; Utah State Tax 
Commission; Salt Lake 
County; and Insurance Company 
of North America, 
Counterdefendants. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 890063-CA 
Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson (on Rule 31 
Hearing). 
The judgment and findings of the trial court are 
supported by the evidence and the record before the trial 
court. Also, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to 
allow plaintiff's amendment. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Dated ~thjLs /fr^Say of March, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT:/ 
Regna 
-///'/ Aft* 
lT^Gat f fpJudge 
5§6 Utah 
PER CURIAM: 
753 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
I Dean Lancaster, pro se. der when the prosecution was unable to 
David L Wilkinson, Kimberly Hornak, prove the aggravating circumstances with 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respon- which he had been charged Inhishabeat 
corpus petition, plaintiff appears to allege 
that he thought he had pleaded to '"uniateih 
tional murder" and that be should k n 
in propria persona, a pe- to® sentenced to one to fifteen years1 
tition for post-conviction relief in the trial imprisonment instead of five years to Mi 
court with respect to his guilty plea to and Plaintiff stated that he was innocent of 
subsequent conviction of second degree knowingly and intentionally committing the 
murder. The trial court dismissed the peti- offense and was therefore unlawfully b 
tion as inappropriate, as plaintiff had not prisoned and that he had been denied due 
brought a motion to withdraw his guilty process and effective assistance of counsel 
plea and a collateral attack under rule 65B In addition, plaintiff challenged the eoufr 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was tutionality of the statutes under which he 
therefore not permissible. We reverse and
 m d ^ and sentenced 
remand for entry of findings on the merits. « . / , . . , „
 A1. , 
; 6
 This Court has repeatedly stated that 
In response to plaintiffs petition, the
 hhm ^ b not a substjtute for ^ 
State brought a motion to dismiss on the cannot be used to perform the function of 
ground that under the rationale of 5tote t;. ^ ^ ^
 PortertCook, 
Gibbons, 740 P 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), plain-
 w m m m m m). ^ 
bff was precluded from bringing a motion
 m t ^ m m m m m 
or post^nvicton relief until he had fat
 m) m m % ^ m m 
1 ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ l e . . ^ 702(Utahl979). But it has also recognized plea. The trial court adopted that rationale .. . . , , . , 
: ... j . j . ., ,/tx^ that review by habeas corpus is appropn-in its order denying writ of habeas corpus, 
and the State repeats it before this Court in 
challenging the merits of plaintiffs habeas 
ate in unusual circumstances to assure fun-
damental fairness and to reexamine a con-
viction when the nature of the alleged error 
is such that it would be unconscionable not 
State u ^6orw is inapposite here. Gil. ^ ^ a m ^ Corfianna, 660 P.2d at 1115 
bons pteaded guilty to several charges and ^ ^
 mm^f k ^ ^ 
then appealed dmctly after the trial court ^
 m rf ^ M m rf M 
^ n i T 1 ™ - Procedurespecificallyprovidesthataprii. 
mipmonment He did not file a motion to
 onerwhoa88ertsa8ubstaDtWdenialofhig 
withdraw his guilty plea before perfecting ., .. . ...
 M . , , , 
.. . V . ' « . . ; . . , , . constitutional nghts may institute a pro-his appeal, and the State argued that this 
Court should decline to consider the guilty 
plea issue because it was not raised below, 
740 P.2d at 1311. This Court declined to 
follow the State's request and remanded 
the case to enable Gibbons to file a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, retaining juris-
diction over the case for further action. 
State v, G\bbom did not represent a collat-
eral attack on the guilty plea. 
ceeding under this rule." See also Mar-
tinez v, Smith, supra, where this Court 
held a petition for habeas corpus reviewa-
ble without first requiring the withdrawal 
of a guilty plea. Given the allegations 
plaintiff made in his petition, it was there-
fore error for the trial court to dismiss the 
petition without granting a hearing. 
Without the benefit of findings, this 
Conversely here, plaintiff filed a post- Court is in no position to review the valid* 
conviction petition to challenge the validity ty of plaintiff8 claims. It is safe to Ur 
of his guilty plea some nine years after the sume that trial courts prefer to give short 
time for a direct appeal had run It ap- shrift to the many postconviction petition! 
pears from his handwritten pleadings that which they decide lack merit It is equally 
te waa originally charged with first degree safe to assume that an appellate court W& 
murder, but pleaded to second degree mur- be unable to review the case in a vacuum 
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and will have to remand it where no ratio- was not precluded from seeking reforma-
nale for dismissal or denial is given. A tion of commission schedule under con-
simple finding, on the other hand, will suf- tract; and (3) middleman was not entitled 
fice in the vast majority of cases to limit to recover costs of deposing two witnesses 
the judicial process to one review. The and serving subpoena on one witness. 
traJ courts basis fw dismissing plaintiffs Vacated and remanded 
petition in this case was erroneous, as stat-
ed. The record is too sparse for this Court 
to determine whether the issues raised by 1. Pleading *448(4) 
the pleadings were legal, so that it could In breach of contract action in which 
affirm the trial court on the ground that middleman who sold "coffee extender prod-
the claims were properly resolved as a mat- uct" for suffer sought to recow conuni-
ter of law, See Gonmles v, Morris, 610 sions under contract with supplier, trial 
Pid 1285,1286 (Utah 1980). Instead, it court erred in denying middleman's motion 
appears that plaintiff claims irregularity in to amend to include cause of action for 
the reception of his guilty plea, an issue reformation of contract so the commission 
that should have been considered by the schedules could be changed; issue of corn-
trial court. mission schedules was not raised until sec-
He case is remanded for entry of find- ond day of trial and court did not allow 
ings on the merits, middleman to submit evidence on issue of 
parties' intent in entering contract 
2. Reformation of Instruments £=25 
Middleman who sold "coffee extender 
product" for supplier was not precluded 
from seeking reformation of commission 
schedule under contract with supplier be-
cause contract included integration clause. 
3. Reformation of Instruments & M \ 
45(1) 
Reformation of contract is equitable 
remedy which must be pled with particular-
ity and established by clear and convincing 
proof. 
4, Costs « H 193 
In middleman's action against supplier 
to recover commissions under contract with 
supplier, middleman was not entitled to re-
cover costs of deposing two witnesses and 
serving subpoena on one witness. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d). 
5, Costs **2W 
Party claiming entitlement to cost of 
depositions has burden of demonstrating 
that depositions were reasonably necessary 
and whether that burden is met is within 
sound discretion of trial court Rules Civ, 
Proc, Rule 54(d). 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
?. 
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent 
No. 86H11-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 21,1988. 
Middleman brought action for breach 
of contract against supplier, seeking ac-
counting and judgment for sums due under 
contract The Third District Court, Salt 
lake County, Dean E. Conder, J,, entered 
judgment in favor of supplier, and middle-
man appealed The Court of Appeals, 
Gnenwwd, J., held that (1) trial court 
erred in denying middleman's motion to 
inend to include cause of action for refor-
mm of contract so the commission 
Kbedules could be changed; (2) middleman 
i Appeal and Error **9$4(1) 
Trial court's ruling on whether to 
award party the costs of depositions is pre-
<508 Utah 753 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
sumed correct and will not be disturbed 
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest 
clear abuse of discretion Rules CixProc, 
Rule 54(d). 
Kevin J. Sutterfield (argued), LesKe W. 
Slaugh, Ray G, Martineau, P.C., Provo, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
Terry M. Crellin (argued), M. Wayne 
for defendant and respondent 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS 
and BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff, Lloyd's Unlimited (Lloyd's), ini-
tiated this action against defendant, Na-
ture's Way Marketing, Ltd. (Nature's 
Way), for breach of contract, seeking an 
accounting and judpent for sums due un-
der the contract The court found that the 
parties had entered into a valid and en-
forceable contract and awarded Lloyd's 
$416.25. Lloyd's appeals, claiming that the 
court improperly denied its motion to 
amend the complaint to include a cause of 
action for reformation and that the trial 
court's findings of fact were clearly errone-
ous. Lloyd's requests modification of the 
lower court's award and entry of judgment 
against Nature's Way for $39,710.41. Al-
ternatively, Lloyd's requests that the judg-
ment be vacated and the case remanded. 
We reverse and remand. 
FACR 
In early 1982, Lloyd Dowdk (Dowdle), 
president of Lloyd's, and Lynn Burning-
ham (Burningham), president of Nature's 
Way, began negotiating terms of a contract 
involving a "coffee extender product" 
(product). The contract was to provide 
that Lloyd's would receive a commission 
from Nature's Way for product sold to 
Yurika Foods Corporation (Yurika) by Na-
ture's Way in consideration of Lloyd's ef-
forts in inducing Yurika to purchase and 
market the product In early August 1982, 
Dowdle drafted a handwritten document 
which stated that Lloyd's would receive 
$1.00 commission for each pound of prod-
uctsold On August 11,1982, after Dow. 
die and Burningham discussed the doc-
ument, Dowdle crossed out the commission 
paragraph he had drafted and inserted a 
new schedule in the handwritten contract 
which, as found by the trial court, provided 
the following commission schedule: 
1 unit—€0 packets pack: i5< 
1 unit—2 lb. bulk pack: jjfe 
1 unit—5 lb, bulk pack: 50* 
1 unit—37 lb. bulk pack: $1,00 
The parties then signed the agreement 
Several days later, Dowdle's secretary 
typed the agreement from the handwritten 
version. The typewritten agreement set 
forth thf same commission schedule as set 
out above except the commission on the 5 
lb. bulk pack was .50c rather than 50t, 
The typewritten agreement also repeated 
verbatim the following clause from the 
handwritten agreement 'This agreement 
contains the entire understanding of the 
parties hereto and may not be altered, 
amended, modified, or discharged in any 
way whatsoever except by subsequent 
agreement in writing by all parties hereto." 
The parties then signed die typewritten 
agreement and Nature's Way paid Lloyd's 
$500, representing commission earned from 
April 24,1982 to August 1,1982. The 
parties did not make a formal accounting 
of the sizes or amount of the product sold 
to earn the $500 commission. 
Between August 1,1982 and February 
28,1984, Nature's Way received more than 
$625,000 for product sold to Yurika but 
failed to pay any commissions to Lloyd's. 
Subsequently, Lloyd's initiated this action, 
alleging in paragraph 5 of its complaint 
that Nature's Way owed it commissions 
based on the following commission sched-
ule: 
60 packets pack: $ .25 
2 lb. bulk pack: .35 
5 lb. bulk pack: ,50 
37 lb. bulk pack: 1.00 
Nature's Way's answer to paragraph 5 
stated 'Defendant denies the validity rf 
the agreement and therefore denies the 
allegations in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff lj 
complaint to the effect that defendant» 
I LOYD'S UNL1MT 
^ • - • w ' ^ f i f c - [2]«evidence is 
sum of money. 
^ s i o n o f s u c h ^ w ^ ^ 
T *. to amend o w * — - dice him in maintaining his actionw» 
f^ithaawaanotawa* l , r J a m t * • • * * • 
*fiZSi'*Uf£l ^the objecting party to meet such 
w awarded Uoyd's ^  -»; -&&* to«"«" >"-"T ^ w 
^ t S to amend the complamt ?u§m***~™ 
wbpoent 
00W
 feff T h e s e c o n d p a r t o t ^ - " 
0,1
 * ^ Z tavin* to motion to [
 ded w h en evidence is objecteau> 
K h i s t a t e a : , . ^ Utah Supreme Court toussed ^  
mC^esnotraaedbythe ead- Theu ^ ** Sssg &ss&i 
i ( * » W l l « " 1 Hn . ,k md 
tod to ra»e ™* w"~ ;
 f f ^ > ^ww^jSJ^r^^^)^ 
f a c t i o n of any party atany M fog!»Sj| 
lafterjudginenOf^ S ^ S ^ E 
^ does not affect the result of the £ 2 2 
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ing to their dispute. What they are enti-
tled to is notice of the issues raised and 
ao opportunity to meet them. When this 
is accomplished, t k is all that is re-
quired Our rules provide for liberality 
to allow examination into and settlement 
of all issues bearing upon the controver-
sy, but safeguard the rights of the other 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a 
new issue if he so requests. 
Accord William a State Farm In Co., 
656 P.2d 966,970-71 (Utah 1982), 
B. Procedural Background 
In order to properly assess the validity of 
the trial court's rulings, we must first pro-
vide a rather detailed description of the 
procedural history of this case. 
The record reveals that proceedings in 
this matter focused on Lloyd's theory of 
lack of consideration, up until the second 
day of trial As stated earlier, Nature's 
Way's answer to the complaint generally 
denied liability under the contract, without 
specifically addressing the commission rate 
amounts alleged in the complaint The an-
swer also included an affirmative defense 
of lack of consideration' Prior to trial, 
Lloyd's filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, seeking judgment in the sum of 
$31,545.64 plus accruing interest The mo-
tion was supported by the affidavit of a 
certified public accountant which calculated 
the amount due under the contract utilizing 
the commission schedule as alleged in the 
complaint and invoices of sales made by 
Nature's Way to Yurika. Lloyd's memo-
randum in support of the motion and 
"Statement of Uncontested Facts" again 
set forth the same schedule as in the com-
plaint Nature's Way's memorandum in 
opposition to the motion for summary judg-
ment states "Defendant has no objection to 
what plaintiff has set out as uncontested 
facts other than that important uncontest-
ed facts were omitted" The memorandum 
then sets forth additional "facts" but does 
not mention the commission rate amounts. 
l i e court denied the motion for summary 




1. This teitinxmy strikes us u incootistent with 
Nature's Way's contention that the agreement 
of what consideration Lloyd's was to p n 
vide in order to earn the commission 
Burningham testified that he expected 
Dowdle to do a lot of traveling to procure 
sales for Nature's Way, and that in regid 
to payment of Dowdle's travel expense 
"That's the reason why I offered the con*, 
mission. And I offered that—I offered it 
to him because it would have been very 
lucrative for him."1 
On the second day of trial, Burningham 
testified under direct examination as to 
what the contract said, as follows: 
Q. What does it state will be payable 





Q. Quarter of a cent, I guess. 
On cross examination, Lloyd's counsel 
began to question Burningham about the 
intent of the parties on the commission rate 
amounts. The trial court sustained Na-
ture's Way's objection to such questioning. 
After trial, but before the court entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
Lloyd's filed a motion for an order grant-
ing leave to file an amended complaint to 
conform to the evidence tjo include a cause 
of action for reformation of the contract 
Lloyd's also filed a post trial memorandum 
which included excerpts from the deposi-
tion of Burningham, as follows: 
Q. Had you made commissions to 
Lloyd's... you would pay him 35 
cents for each two pound bulk pack? 
A. Correct 
Q. Based on the 300 figure? 
A. Correct 
Q. For the five pound bulk you would 
pay him 50 cents based on the 180 
figure? 
A. Correct 
Lloyd's also submitted Dowdle's affidirt 
which stated that he habitually noted da* 
yielded commissioos of only (416.25 over M 
time period In question. 
LLOYD'S .^LIMITED i. NATURE'S WAY Utah 5 H 
BHI points erroneously, as was done on at [1] CoosequentJy, we bokl that the trial 
least part of the handwritten agreement court erred in denying the motion to amend 
•. Several months after the trial the court to »** * &**of «*•fop reformation 
^fitoed fimiings of fact, which included the of the contract where the issue of comiM-
[ftDowmg: the handwritten agreement exe- ** 8chedttle8 was not raised unta the 
toted by the parties had commisaion rates second day of trial and where the court did 
i f i5e, ,35*, 50t, and $1.00; the typed wt allot Lloyd's to submit evidence cm the 
agreement executed by the parties had issue of the parties'intent in entering 4 e 
commission rates of ,25<, .35c, .50*, and contract Because the motion to amend 
(LOO; and the intent of the parties with should have been granted, we reverse and 
respect to commissions did not change be- remand for further proceedings on the ref-
tween execution of the two agreements, ormation issue. 
Further, the court found that the parties 
hid stipulated to the amount of product 
iold during the time in question. The court 
eooduded that the typed contract was a 
D. Reformation of Contract 
[2,3] We further note that the trial 
raHd, integrated and'enforceable contract court apparently believed that the ^pewi* 
Centered judgment for $487.87 and costs teD "f*0?1i ^ n o t » M *mtter of 
of $138.77. 
The court denied the motion to amend 
the complaint to include a cause of action 
for reformation 
C. Application of Law 
law, be reformed, because of the inte-
gration clause included in the contract1 
Reformation of a contract is an equitable 
remedy which must be pled with particular-
ity and established by clear and convincing 
proof. Brigg$v.LiddeHMmm}m 
In this case, when, on the second day of (Utah 1985). The Briggt court stated: 
trial, Burningham first testified that the
 A mtmi mj ta nimei for either of 
commission for a sixty pound bulk pack 
was a quarter of a cent, Lloyd's attorney 
did not object to the testimony on the 
ground that it was not within the issues 
framed by the pleadings. Therefore, be-
cause no objection was raised, we conclude 
that there was implied consent to trying of 
the issue and the first part of Rule 15(b) 
ippiies, allowing consideration of the issue. 
On the other hand, Lloyd's had notice of 
the issue of commission rates only on the 
second day of trial, and by the court's 
rulings, had no adequate opportunity to 
meet the issue. We, therefore, also find 
that it was an abuse of discretion to con-
comitantly disallow Lloyd's to respond to 
the newly raised issue, by the court's refus-
al to consider evidence of intent and denial 
of the motion to amend the complaint to 
plead reformation of contract There was 
no evidence of prejudice which would result 
to Nature's Way and, indeed, amendment 
two reasons, first, if the instrument 
does not embody the intentions of both 
parties to the contract, a mutual mistake 
has occurred, and reformation is appro-
priate. Second, if one party is laboring 
under a mistake about a contract term 
and that mistake either has been induced 
by the other party or is known by and 
conceded to by the other party, then the 
inequitable nature of the other party's 
conduct will have the same operable ef-
fect as a mistake, and reformation is 
permissible. 
li at 772. Reformation has also been ap-
plied in instances of drafter error. "Refor-
mation is clearly appropriate where there is 
a variance between the written deed and 
the true agreement of the parties caused 
by a draftsman." HotHnger v. Jensen, 684 
P.2d 1271f 1273 (Utah 1984). 
On remand, the court should allow 
would allow realization of one of the crite- Lloyd's to present whatever evidence it can 
m under Rule 15(b)—"presentation of the muster to establish its right to reformation 
merits of the action." of the contract Moreover, it is not pre-
I Hie court may have beiieved reformation was 
not available for other reasons, but the intc-
gratioa clause was the ooiy rationak menttoned 
by the court 
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eluded from doing so by the integration 
clause included in the contract An inte-
gration clause may prevent enforcement of 
prior or contemporaneous agreements on 
the same subject, but "does not prevent 
proof of fraudulent representations by a 
party to the contract, or of legality, acci-
dent, or mistake..., [P]aper and ink pos-
sess no magic power to cause statements 
of fact to be true when they are actually 
untrue," Corinn on Contracts, § 518 at 
405^)7 (1960). 
n. COSTS 
[4-6] Lloyd's also contends that the 
court erred in failing to award it the costs 
of deposing Burningham and Webb and 
serving a subpoena on Burningham. Utah 
R,Civ.P. 54(d) provides that except as the 
rule otherwise provides, "costs shall be al-
lowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs...." 
The general rule is that under Utah 
R.Civ.P, 54(d) "costs" means those fees 
which are "required to be paid to the court 
and to witnesses...." Frampton t>. Wil-
son, 605 P id 771,774 (Utah 1980). How-
ever, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the expenses of taking depositions are 
also allowable as costs if they were reason-
ably necessary. John P m Assoc, Inc v. 
Davis, 588 P.2d 713,715 (Utah 1978). Dep-
osition costs are generally allowed as nec-
essary and reasonable "where the develop-
ment of the case is of such a complex 
nature that discovery cannot be accom-
plished through the less expensive method 
of interrogatories, requests for admissions 
and requests for the production of doc-
uments." Highland Constr, Co, v. Union 
Pot ML, 683 P.2d 1042,1051 (Utah 1984). 
The party claiming entitlement to the costs 
of depositions has the burden of demon-
strating that the depositions were reason-
ably necessary and whether that burden is 
met is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court li; first Sec Bank of Utah 
U v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563,567 (Utah 
1974), The trial court's ruling on whether 
to award a party costs of depositions is 
presumed correct and will not be disturbed 
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. First Sec 
M , 5 2 1 P . 2 d a t 5 6 7 , The Utah Supreme 
Court has declined to extend the r u k 
which allows recovery of the cost of taking 
a deposition, to expenses such as service g 
a subpoena, Frampton, 605 P i d t t T to 
Lloyd's claims that the depositions flf 
Burningham and Webb were essential fqfj 
the development and presentation of tSf 
case and that Webb's deposition was t a k ? 
because both parties anticipated Aat Webr 
would be unavailable to testify at trial $ 
addition, Lloyd's argues that because | 
dons of Burningham's depositions 
used at trial, it should be awarded the c 
of Burningham's deposition Lloyd's a f y 
contends that it should have been awardelj 
the costs of serving Burningham with a 
subpoena to insure his appearance at the 
deposition. Nature's Way had previously 
failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to 
compel discovery, and Lloyd's believed that 
the subpoena was necessary to secun* 
Burningham's appearance at the deposit 
tion. 
Nature's Way, to the contrary, arguei 
that because Lloyd's did not use WebbV 
deposition at trial and did not publish Bonh 
ingham's or Webb's deposition at trial, the 
court properly denied Lloyd's the costs d 
the deposition. Nature's Way also cofr 
tends that Lloyd's could have avoided the 
cost of the subpoena by telephoning N* 
ture's Way's attorney to see if the corpo* 
tion would produce Burningham for a depo-
sition, and, therefore, the trial court eft 
rectly denied Lloyd's the cost incurred ia 
We find that, in view of these argfr 
ments, the trial court's decision to deny 
Lloyd's the costs of the two depositions 
was reasonable. Apparently, Lloyd's failed 
to prove that the deposition costs wen 
reasonably necessary and could not be I * 
complished through less expensive meanly 
Therefore, because the burden of p r o ] 
was not met and because the trial courfi 
decision was reasonable, we hold that fa 
trial court did not abuse its discretion i|y 
denying Lloyd's the costs of taking, m 
'ofATE v, S T U B S Utah 5 1 3 
y e also hold that the trial court's deci- Appeals held that petition failed to satisfy 
i to deny Lloyd's the cost of subpoena- applicable requirements. 
j Burningham was not unreasonable, in Petition denied. 
\ of Franpton, where the court de-
| to extend the rules for awarding 
ets to expenses such as service Criminal Law <»1871 
9 and vacated the trial court's Petition for certificate of probable 
of such costs. Therefore, we hold cause lacked required affidavit of counsel 
the trial court did not abuse its discre- or memorandum of law supporting defend-
, in refusing to award Lloyd's the costs antfs position that issues presented on ap-
b j e r r i n g the subpoena. peal were novel or fairly debatable. 
F III. FINDINGS 
third claim of error is that the 
E l l court's findings are not supported by 
m evidence. Because we hold that that 
m trial court erred in denying the motion 
&'amend, we need not reach the issue of 
Aether the findings are supported by the 
evidence. 
t H e judgment of the trial court is vacat-
ed and the matter remanded for further 
Jjweeedings in accordance with this opin-
ion. 
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Dickie Lynn STUKES, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880154-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 22,1988. 
Following ruling of the Third District 
p r t , Summit County, Pat B. Brian, J., on 
Jjprch issue, defendant filed petition for 
prt&bte of probable cause. The Court of 
Bradley P. Rich, Yengich, Rich, Xaix 4 
Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
David L Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., 
Sandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
Before JACKSON, ORME and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. (On Law and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on a 
Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause. 
Appellant's counsel filed the petition on 
March 10,1988. It was accompanied by a 
brief Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties, but was not supported by the affidavit 
of counsel required by State v. Neeley, 707 
P.2d 647 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the rationale for the proce-
dure mandated in Neeley as follows: 
The record of proceedings below is not 
available in this Court at the time such 
petitions are brought In addition, the 
petitions filed by the defendants are gen-
erally conclusory and contain little infor-
mation concerning the case. The attor-
ney general, who is by law required to 
argue before this Court, is uninformed 
concerning the facts of the case or the 
proceedings taken in the court below and 
therefore finds it difficult to respond to 
petitions for certificates of probable 
cause. H i s Court is likewise un» 
informed concerning the record antQ oral 
argument In order that this Court may 
make an informed decision in issuing cer-
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operation of the corporate entity, that cor 
porate records were not kept, and that the 
husband used the corporation and other 
corporate shells as a facade for his person-
al business operations. 
i CorpontkHis ^1.6(10) 
Corporate veil which protects stock-
holders from individual liability will be 
pierced only reluctantly and cautiously. 
i Corporationi t = l , ^ ) 
To disregard corporate entity under al-
ter ego doctrine, there must be shown such 
a unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, and it 
must be shown that, if the corporate form 
were observed, it would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity; 
it is not necessary that plaintiff prove actu-
al fraud but he must show that a failure to 
pierce the corporation veil would result in 
an injustice. 
6. Corporations **\M\) 
Factors which are significant in deter 
mining whether corporate veil should be 
pierced are undercapitalization of a one-
man corporation, failure to observe corpo-
rate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, 
siphoning of corporate funds by dominant 
stockholder, nonfunctioning of other offi-
cers or directors, absence of corporate 
records, use of corporation as a facade or 
operations of the dominant shareholder, 
and use of the corporate entity in promote 
ing injustice or fraud. 
I Corporations Plttl) 
Failure to observe corporate formali-
ties, which may justify piercing corporate 
veil, includes such activities as commence* 
ment of business without the issuance of 
shares, lack of shareholders at directors 
meetings, lack of signing of consents, and 
making of decisions by shareholders u if 
they were partners. 
that he referred to the corporation's check- i Corporations ^ L « l ) 
ing account as his personal account, that he Rationale used by courts in peraittinf 
Utah 783 
PhTllii E. COLMAN9 Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
?, 
Willian J. COULIN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
N0.8JK2MA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct ( 1 X 7 . 
Husband appealed from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., which divided property in 
connection with divorce. The Court of Ap-
peals, Garff, J, held that (1) evidence sus-
tained trial court's determination to pierce 
corporate veil of husband's corporations, 
and (2) distribution was proper. 
Affirmed. 
1. Heading * m 
If theory of recovery is fully tried by 
the parties, court may base its decision on 
that theory and deem the pleadings amend-
ed, even if the theory was not originally 
pleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the 
pretrial order; that the issue has, in fact, 
been tried and that the procedure has been 
authorized by the express or implied con-
sent of the parties must be evident from 
the record. 
t Divorce «=>283 
Although alter ego issue was not spe-
cifically raised in pleadings, where entire 
trial testimony concerned husband's control 
over assets in question, the issue was tried 
by the consent of the parties and trial court 
properly based its decision on that issue. 
I Divorte *253(2) 
Finding that corporation was hus-
band's alter ego was supported by evidence 
COLMAN T. COLMAN 
«e^he » without standing to complain Frank J. ADen, Salt Lake Otv for d* 
w k e n a n m N ^ d o e s t t e s a m , fendant and a p ^ l l T ^' 
). Dirora t=mi) 
"""••w «';wJwe,A«eniOHOII,!5 
Former spouses attempting to shield for plaintiff and respondent 
lets from a winrUrrk**) 
ing that he was acting on behalf of anyone pal shareholder or owner conducts hit pci% 
othar than himself, that the officers and vate and corporate business on an ister*^  
directors played little or no role in the changeable or joint basis as if they weft 
^.p.vfvivj vuour 
botion by using a corporate form are espe- &fow BILLINGS, GARFF and 
dally looked upon with judicial disfavor. JACKSON. 
I J, Divorce *=2512 
Fact that property distribution may m m 
not have been mathematically equal is not {j^yyrp j U ( w 
sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse 
of discretion as fair and equitable property Defendant/appellant William J. Cohnan 
distribution is not necessarily an equal dis* appeals from a property settlement judg-
J ^ J J ^ ment in favor of plaintiff/respondent Phyl-
lis E. Colman stemming from their 1977 
II Divorce PIMM divorce. He seeks reversal of the judg-
Trial court did not abuse its discretion ment 
in dividing property after piercing corpo- The parties were divorced after a twenty-
rate veil on the grounds that the corpora- four year childless marriage during which 
tion was the husband's alter ego. ^
 mM gubgtaDtiaj pn)perty Qn 
11 Divorce ^2513(5) ^ *1977'* ^ ¥ ^ rf * w c e , 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion they executed a written property settle-
in requiring husband to pay an amount mt * * * Mm ^ m M 
representing a percentage of the price of not been resolved as to which assets con-
proceeds from sale of ranch where he trolled by defendant were part of the mari-
found that husband held an interest in the ^ **> tt ^mt ^M ta to 
^ provide plaintiff with a "complete account-
ing of all stocks currently owned by him or 
I t Estoppel « 2 ( 4 ) in which he [had] any interest," and a 
Estoppel arises when there is a false "complete accounting of all royalty inter-
representation or concealment of material ests currently owned by him or in which he 
facts made with knowledge, actual or con- [had] any interest" within one year of the 
structive, of the facts to a party who is agreement Once the extent of defend-
without knowledge or the means of bowl- ant's holdings was determined, plaintiff 
edge of the real facts and made with an was to receive one-half of defendant's in-
intention that the representation be acted terest in any stocks "held in. . [his] name 
upon, and the party to whom the represen- or in which he [had] any interest," and 
tatxm was made relies or acts upon it to his one-half of the sales proceeds of the 
prejudice, Anderson Ranch, jointly owned property 
11 E s t o p p e l ^ located m Cache County, Utah. 
Estoppel cannot be inferred from facts Much of the dispute between the parties 
of which party to be estopped had no centered around defendant's relationship to 
)mkfcot Owanah Oil forporation [Owanah], a close-
ly held corporation which defendant and 
li. Husband and Wife *279(1) Francois deGunsberg had founded in 1952 
Wife was not estopped from denying to engage in oil and gas exploration De-
that husband had furnished adequate ac- fendant had served as Owanah's president 
counting as required by their divorce during much of the parties' marriage. In 
ipeenent even though wife's attorney had 1969, Owanah was restructured to gener» 
ntnrned certain stock certificates whkh he ate outside capital, As a consequence, de-
lad turned over to them. fendant and plaintiff held approximately 
84 Utah 743 PACIFIC 8EP0B!ffiR, 2d SERIES 
twenty percent of Owanah's outstanding 
At the tine of the divorce, defendant 
also controlled stock, originally issued in 
various names, in other closely held corpo-
rations: Western Oil Shale Corporation, 
Cayman Corporation, and Royalty Invest-
ment Company. Defendant claimed that 
most of this stock belonged to Owanah, 
was not part of the marital estate, and, 
therefore, was not subject to the property 
division agreement 
The Western 03 Shale Compy stock 
was issued in 1964 in consideration for 
Owanah's interest in several oil shale leas-
es. Although defendant alleged that none 
of the parties' personal funds were expend-
ed to acquire these leases, he introduced no 
evidence beyond his testimony to that ef-
fect He ateo explained that the stock was 
issued in names other than Owanah's so 
that Owanah could sell it more easily by 
avoiding normal corporate formalities. At 
the time of trial, he held at least 28^ 200 
Western Oil Shale shares under his person-
al control, but admitted ownership of only 
2 # 6 of them. 
Cayman stock had been issued by Cay-
man Corporation as consideration for stock 
in another closely held corporation, Nation-
al Oil Shale Corporation, and for an oil and 
gas lease with a producing oil well. De-
fendant testified that both the National Oil 
Shale and Cayman shares were issued in 
his name for ease in sale and handling, but 
that he held them in trust for third parties. 
However, he introduced no evidence other 
than his testimony that there was an actual 
trust relationship between himself and oth-
ers. Part of the reason for his failure to 
introduce evidence was the lack of Cayman 
and National Oil Shale corporate records. 
At the time of trial, defendant held at least 
48,000 shares of Cayman stock in his name. 
At the time of the property settlement 
agreement, Royalty Investment Company 
owned, as its only major asset, the 
Anderson Ranch. At trial, defendant testi-
fied that Owanah and two other parties had 
made installment payments on the ranch 
and, thus, were entitled to W of Royal-
ty's outstanding stock. However, defend-
ant's earlier deposition contradicted this 
testimony, stating that he and plaintiff 
owned ffift of the Royalty stock. De-
fendant, in his personal financial state* 
ments, valued the ranch at between $2509-
000 and $1,000,000. 
In January 1982, Royalty sold the 
Anderson ranch for $250,000 and autho-
rized Owanah to use the proceeds, l i e 
only consideration which Royalty received 
for the proceeds was its choice between an 
interest-bearing loan and a 4% overruling 
royalty interest in Owanah, 
Defendant also claims that he made an 
oral accounting pursuant to the property 
settlement agreement with the law firm 
Roe and Fowler, and turned over to Roe 
and Fowler all stock certificates in the par-
ties' safe deposit box. Because plaintiff 
was not satisfied that there had been an 
adequate accounting under the terms of 
the property settlement agreement, she fi-
nally brought this action on Hay 29,1980, 
to compel the accounting and judgment for 
any damages caused by defendant's delay 
in submitting the accounting. The purpose 
of the accounting was to identify the 
amount to which plaintiff was entitled as 
her share of the marital estate. 
The trial court agreed that defendant 
had not made an adequate accounting, find-
ing that Owanah was defendant's alter ego 
even though this issue was not explicitly 
raised in the pleadings. The court also 
found that the assets subject to the ac-
counting were, in fact, owned by defend-
ant, and, pursuant to the tarns of the 
settlement agreement, that plaintiff wis 
entitled to one-half of those assets. How-
ever, because most of the assets had been 
sold by defendant, the court established a 
monetary value for the liquidated assets 
and included that amount as part of the 
marital estate to be distributed between 
the parties, Although this was an account-
COLMANv, 
oumnmm 
ego issue was property before the court, 
was there sufficient evidence to sustain the 
court's finding that Owanah was defend-
p! (3) Does applying the al-
t a property distribo-
ticm contrary to th€ parties1 property distri-
botion agreement? (i) Did the evidence, 
findings, and conclusions support the order 
requiring defendant to pay plaintiff an 
amount representing a percentage of the 
Anderson Ranch safe proceeds? (5) Is 
plaintiff estopped from denying that de-
fendant furnished a satisfactory account-
ing? 
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(%fctot*7) 
that was tried inadvertently." Mil Motor 
G>„506F.2dat711. 
stipulated property settlement agreement 
without objection by either party. 
Defendant raises the following issues e a 
appeal: (1) Was the alter ego issue proper 
ly before the trial court? {2) If the alter: 
Under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
M Procedure, issues not raised by the 
pleadings may be tried by the express or 
implied consent of the parties.1 The Utah 
Supreme Court has observed that issues 
tried by express or 
treated as if raised in the 
Therefore, "even failure to amend the 
pleadings does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues/' (knmlIuCo.of 
An. t Cmicm Dynasty Corp., 545 ?M 
502,506 (Utah 1976). 
[1] If a theory of recovery is fully tried 
by the parties, the court may base its deci-
sion on that theory and deem the pleadings 
amended, even if the theory was not origi-
nally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings 
or the pretrial order. Mil Motor Co, v. 
Lotm/Eut, Inc., 506 F.2d 709,711 (6th 
Gr.1974). However, that the issue has, in 
fact, been tried, and that this procedure 
has been authorized by express or implied 
consent of the parties must be evident from 
the record. Wirti t FM, Sloan, Inc., 285 
P5upp. 669,675 (W.D.Pa.1968). "Atrial 
court may not base its decision on an issue 
I Utah R.CivJ> 15(b) (1977) reads as Mows: 
When issues not raised by the pleading ire 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties.tbey shall be treated in all respectsas 
if they had bees raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence tod to raise these issues may be 
made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after Judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these 
isues. If evidence is objected to at the trial 
lied consent to try an issue may be 
"where one party raises an issue 
material to the other party's case or where 
evidence is introduced without objection," 
(knml In Co.ofAn.fW Pid at 505-
06, where it "appeals] that the parties 
understood the evideice [in»] to be aimed 
at the impleaded issue." MMotorCo^ 
506PidatTl l See First Security Bank 
ofUtohi, Colonial Ford, k , 5 9 7 P i d 
859,861 (Utah 1979). 
Thus, the test for determining whether 
pleadings should be deemed amended un-
der Utah R.Civ,P, 15(b) is "whether the 
opposing party had a fair opportunity to 
al evidence if the case were retried on a 
different theory." UPohl Const Co. v. 
Marshall, 640 Fid 266,267 (10th Cir.1981). 




[2] In the present case, even though the 
alter ego issue was not specifically raised 
in the pleadings, either initially or by 
amendment, the entire trial testimony con-
cerned defendant's control over the assets 
in question. During trial, evidence con-
cerning every element of the alter ego is-
sue was introduced without objection. Fur-
ther, the basic question raised in an alter 
ego case is whether the principal had per 
sonal control over assets which he claimed 
to belong to the corporation. Since this 
question is the essential issue presented by 
this accounting action, we find that the 
parties received adequate notice of the al-
ter ego issue and an opportunity to meet it 
on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow 
the pleadings to b e a m e d when the preset 
tition of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party 
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in main-
taining his action or d e f o * upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a cwtttouance, if neces-
sary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
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I k e was no indication in the record that 
defendant ever represented to the court 
that he was taken by surprise or was otlw 
wise disadvantaged in meeting the alter 
egoissue. SeeChmyv.RwkerM?M 
at 91. We find, therefore, that the alter 
ego issue was properly before the court 
II 
[3,4] Ttoe is sufficient evidence to 
ah was defendant's altar ego. "Ordinarily, 
a corporation is regarded aa a separate and 
distinct legal entity from its stockholders." 
Aodbtabrn VUfar9 29 Utah 2d S7Bf 610 
Pid 526,528 (1973). l b is true whether 
the corporation has many stockholders or 
only one. Ramsey v. Adams, 4 Kan. 
App.2d 184,603 P.2d 1025,1027 (1979); 
JDme v. Enc, 104 MkliApp. 700,305 
N.Wid 297,298 (1981). Consequently, the 
corporate veil which protects stockholders 
from individual liability will only be pierced 
reluctantly and cautiously. Ramsey v. 
Adams,m?.2Att\m;MliamB,Rob-
trts, he v, McDrilling, Co,, 579 S.W.2d 
335,345 (TexXiv.App.1979). 
[5] To disregard the corporate entity 
under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two 
circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a 
unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, but the 
corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one 
or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, 
the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity. 
Norman ft Murray Firtt Thrift <t Loan 
Cb„ 596 P.2d 1028,1030 (Utah 1979). Ac-
cord United States v, HeaUhwin-Midtom 
Convalescent Hosp, and Rehabilitation 
Center, Inc., 511 F % 416 (CD.Calif. 
1981). See also Centurian Corp, v, Fiber-
chm, Inc., 562 Pid 1252, 1253 (Utah 
mDochtaderv. Walker,%Mtt 
1 Failure to observe corporate formalities in-
chides such activities ts commencement of busi-
ness without the issuance of shares, lack of 
shareholders' or directors' meetings, lack of 
signing of consents, and the making of derisions 
by shareholders as if they were partners. /top 
la,inc!.bmponBros.Constr.C(L,tt5VH2d 
76S,772(TaCivipp.l979). 
370,510 P.2d 526,528 (1973); Geary * 
Ctoi,79Utah268,9Pid396,398(1932), 
It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove 
actual fraud, hut must only show that fail-
ure to pierce the corporate veil would re-
sult in in injustice. HtalMn-Midtm 
Convalescent Hosp, 511 F-Supp. at 420. 
[6,7] Certain factors which are deemed 
significant, although not conclusive, in de-
taining whether this test has been net 
include: (1) undercapitalization of a one* 
man corporation; (2) failure to observe cor 
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idends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by 
the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunction-
ing of other officers or directors; (6) ab-
sence of corporate records; (7) the use of 
the corporation as a facade for operations 
of the dominant stockholder or stockhold-
ers; a and (8) the use of the corporate enti-
ty in promoting injustice or fraud. Ram-
sey v. Adams, 603 Pid at 1028; Amoco 
Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 
567 P.2d 1337,1341-42 (1977). See also 
Ramirez v. United States, 514 FiSupp. 759, 
76344 (D.Puerto Rico 1981); Hedthm 
Midtwn Convalescent Hosp,, 511 FJSupp. 
at 418-19; Dillman a Nobles, 351 Soid 
210,213-14 (Laipp.1977). 
[8] The rationale used by courts in per 
mitting the corporate veil to be pierced a 
that if a principal shareholder or owner 
on an interchangeable or joint basis is if 
they were one, he is without standing to 
complain when an injured party does the 
same. Bone Constr. Co, v. Lewis, 148 
Gaipp. 61,250 S.E.2d 861,863 (1978). In 
Lyons a Lyons, 340 So.2d 450,451 (Alt 
Civ.App.1976), the court stated that la] 
court of equity looks through form to sub-
stance and has often disregarded the corpo-
rate form when it was fiction in fact and 
deed and was merely serving the personal 
use and convenience of the owner," The 
l Failure to distinguish between corporate u d 
personal property, the use of corporate fundi to 
pay personal expenses without proper aoooostf-
ing, and fiilure to maintiin coa^ete corponte 
and financial records art looked upon with * 
treme disfavor. Royltx, 5S5 S.Wid at 772. 
U/LMAN T. COLMAN 
Lyons court found a corporation to be a account Although he stated that this oc-
shareholder's alter ego, even though he curred because the bank initially preferred 
owned cmly one share of stock, because be to deal personally with the principals be-
coisxniDgled corporate funds with his own, cause of Owanah's small net worth, he abo 
kept no regular corporate records, meet- continued this practice well after Owanah 
ipgs, or minutes aside from a bank account, acquired substantia] assets, because, as he 
and did not file corporate income tax re- st^ed, adjustments m loans and sales of 
turn See Standage a Standage, 147 stock could be made without time^ onsum-
AritApp. 473,711 Pid 612,614-15 (1985). ing corporate resolutions. 
(J) Former spouses attempting to * Septenber 17, 1976, defendant 
shield assets from a court-ordered property pledged 50,820 shares of Western Oil Shale 
(fistnbution by using a corporate form are stock and 48,000 shares of Cayman stock to 
especially looked upon with judicial disfa- First Security Bank as collateral for loans 
w. Sec Standage v. Standage, 147 Ariz, to Owanah. He testified that this stock 
App. 473,711 Pid 612 (1985); Colandrea M « i M f been issued in his, his broth-
a Colandm, 401 Aid 480 (MACtSpec er's, and his brokers names, rather than in 
App.1979). Owanah's name, so that corporate format 
. , , ., ties could be avoided in selling the stock. 
.. i M ., ' .. ,.
 LA .... Between September 17,1978, and February 
sidered the evidence in the light of this
 M 1(VTA. \ u ' 0 . ; 
i u « j - * w n . L i J *i 23,1979, he held as many as 93,298 shares 
test, finding that Owanah was defendant's '
 A1 Cl1 ' , ' iQnM 
u .. . ,. . m <<rA of Western Oil Shale stock and 48,000 
alter ego on the grounds that 1 'ftjhew .
 in . , . .. ' . 
.. . JZ i u- J • i shares of Cayman stock m his personal 
exists such a unity of ownership and inter- . , .. /
 A kJT 
, , , j / , . j / f L A.1 bank and brokerage accounts. Alltransac-
est between defendant and Owanah Oil . .. JrL. . Al 
n . . . . . .... tons dealing with these shares were autho-
Corporation mat the separate personakties . , , . . . , ,lL x 
,;. ,. /.. . j . . . . rized by his signature without any sugges-
of the corporation and the individual no ; b J 
longer exist," and (2) to recognize such 
separate personalities "would promote in-
justice and an inequitable result" 
For purposes of appellate review, the 
trial court's decision to pierce the corporate 
veil will be upheld if there is substantial 
evidence in favor of the judgment Stand-
age, 711 Pid at 614-16. An examination 
of the present trial record indicates that 
there was substantial evidence supporting 
the trial court's finding that the separate 
personalities of Owanah and defendant no 
First, defendant ignored corporate for-
malities. He stated that he preferred to 
conduct corporate business personally, 
rather than in the corporate name, because 
it was more convenient than observing ap-
propriate corporate procedures, and re-
peatedly did so. 
don that he was acting on behalf of anyone 
else. 
First Security Bank released the 48,000 
shares of Cayman stock and 47,820 shares 
of the Western Oil Shale stock to defend-
ant on July 9,1979. The bank recognized 
this stock as being defendant's personal 
property in that it required defendant to 
sign an indemnity agreement to protect the 
bank from any claim raised by plaintiff 
against the shares. 
Defendant testified that this stock, val-
ued by the trial court at {14.25 per share, 
was later sold to fund one of Owanah's 
projects, and that the proceeds from this 
sale were deposited in Owanah's account 
However, payments for defendant's resi-
dential mortgage, tight and utility bills 
were also made directly from Owanah's 
account, as were numerous cash payments 
to defendant, totalling $22,695.25 within a 
Second, defendant Med to distinguish ^
 m& p ^ To help finance Ow-
between corporate and personal property in anah's activities, defendant also mortgaged 
ha business dealings. the parties' Park City residence for $60,* 
In correspondence wita Rrst Secnrity 000, applied part of the proceeds to a reduc-
Bank, defendant continually referred to the tion of Owanah's debt, and deposited the 
Ovanah checking account as his personal remainder in Owanah's acconnt Defend-
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ant at tains the mortgage payments nuute 
on his behalf by Owanah as repayment by 
Owanah of this mortgage. Further, de-
fendant presented no evidence at trial that 
he maintained any personal checking a t 
cwat apart from Owanahi Personal and 
corporate affairs appear to be bextricably 
interwoven. 
Third, the other officers and directors 
played Utile, if any, role in the operation of 
defendant's corporate entities. Defendant 
produced no evidence at trial, other than 
his testimony, to indicate that others had 
any interest in Owanah, although the trial 
judge requested such evidence on several 
occasions during the trial and the trial was 
recessed for defendant to provide it 
Fourth, there was an almost complete 
failure to keep and maintain corporate 
records. There was no evidence that 
shareholder records were kept for Cayman 
Corporation, even though such records 
were repeatedly requested by plaintiffs 
counsel and the trial judge, and defendant 
was even given an opportunity by the court 
to find and present them. Defendant was 
similarly unable to produce any records 
which showed shareholders, bylaws, or fi-
nancial status of Royalty Investment Cor 
poration, Defendant claimed that Owanah 
owned Cayman stock as well as proceeds 
from the sale of the Anderson Ranch, 
which was owned by Royalty Investment 
macy. Since defendant did not proffer tes-
timony at trial of anyone other than him-
self, purporting to have an interest in Roy. 
alty, Owanah, or the Anderscm Raudi, it s 
difficult to view this transadioo u lay. 
thing but a personal transaction done en-
der a corporate aegis. Thus, defendant1! 
equivocal testimony regarding the owner-
ship of the Anderson Ranch, coupled with 
the lack of substantial evidence that Owan-
ah gave valuable consideration for the pro-
Fifth, there is evidence that Owanah and 
the other corporate shells were used as a 
facade for defendant's personal business 
operations. The most significant evidence 
was the method 'in which the Anderson 
Ranch sale was consummated After the 
property settlement agreement had been 
entered, Royalty Investment Corporation 
sold the ranch, using no corporate formali-
ties, and then deposited the sale proceeds 
in Owanah's bank account for a $ over-
riding royalty interest in the Owanah 
project Plaintiff alleged that this was no 
consideration at all Although the transa& 
t i n was ratified by Royalty on 4 e advice 
of counsel eleven months after the sale and 
three days before trial, such a ratification 
does not invest this transaction with legit* 
a finding that the corporate shells were 
used as a facade for the transfer of proper 
ty from a corporate shell that plaintiff had 
some interest in to one in which she had 
less interest 
Further, defendant's use of Owanah to 
receive the proceeds from the sale of the 
Cayman and Western Oil Company stock, 
coupled with his use of Owanah's account 
to pay his personal living expenses, sug-
gest that defendant was using Owanah as 
a facade for his personal affairs. 
Finally, the use of the corporate entity in 
this circumstance would result in injustice. 
If viewed as legitimate corporate transae* 
tions, plaintiffs post-settlement agreement 
business transactions would convert sub* 
stantial assets, which otherwise would be 
regarded as marital property, to corporate 
assets in which plaintiff had no interest 
Such shielding of assets would result in a 
great injustice to plaintiff. 
Therefore, we find that there was sub-
stantial evidence before the trial court to 
support its finding that defendant's corpo-
rations were actually his alter ego. 
Ill 
Because application of the alter ego doe* 
trine is justified, we reach the issue of 
whether the property division by the trill 
court is in harmony with the parties' prop-
erty settlement a p e m e n t Defendants 
gues that the property division resulting 
from the alter ego finding is contrary to 
the intent of the property settlement agree-
ment because it awards plaintiff more than 
half of the marital estate, and, thus, it i s 
abuse of judicial discretion. 
[10] 
the trial court has wide discretion, and, 
while the appellate court is not necessarily 
bound by its findings, Tnompon % 
J k m m W P J J 360,361-62 (Utah 
J are i 
COLMAN 
corporation formed 
He alleged that a 
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ing their marriage, 
which the 
cates such a manifest injustice or inequity 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion 
S m i E m n , 135 P id 395,397 (Utah 
CtApp.1987); Petmen a Ptterm, 737 
Pid 237,239 (Utah CtApp.1987). Regard-
ing challenges to property distributions, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
must prove a misunderstanding or misap-
plication of the law resulting in substan-
tial and prejudicial error, or that the evi-
dence clearly preponderated against the 
findings, or that such a serious inequity 
resulted from the order as to constitute 
an abuse of the trial court's discretion 
ifcCrory ^ i/cCror^ 599 P^d 1248,1250 
(Utah 1979), That the property distribution 
may not have been mathematically equal is 
not sufficient grounds to constitute an 
abuse of discretion, since a fair and eq-
uitable property distribution is not neces-
sarily an equal distribution See Fletcher 
t Fletcher, 615 Pid 1218,1223-24 (Utah 
1980). 
Further, it is well recognized that a par-
ties' stipulation as to property rights in a 
divorce action, although advisory and 
usually followed unless the court finds it to 
be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessar-
ily binding on the trial court It is only a 
recommendation to be adhered to if the 
court believes it to be fair and reasonable. 
Peanon v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080,1082 
(Utah 1977); Klein i Klein, 544 M 472, 
476 (Utah 1975). Thus, even if the trial 
court does not exactly follow the parties' 
agreement, such a decree is still within the 
trial court's reasonable discretion 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
upheld a trial court's property division un-
der somewhat similar circumstances. In 
h * l t ftity 728 ?3i 117 (Utah 1986), 
the defendant husband appealed from the 
portion of a divorce decree awarding the 
plaintiff wife one-half of the value of a 
to a corporation which he and his wife 
formed during the marriage. Because he 
"utterly failed to prove that the loan did 
indeed exist," in that he could produce no 
papers documenting the loan, any terms, 
conditions of repayment, or interest, and 
because the trial court expressly found 
sonal funds throughout the marriage so 
that it could not trace any assets to any 
source, the court found that he had failed 
to carry his burden of proof. l i at 119. 
[11] Similarly, the present defendant 
has failed to carry his burden of proof that 
the disputed assets are corporate rather 
than personal property, so we find no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's prop-
erty division resulting from application of 
the alter ego theory. 
IV 
Defendant further argues that the trial 
court's order requiring him to pay plaintiff 
an amount representing a percentage of 
the price of the Anderson Ranch sale pro-
ceeds is without support in the findings, 
conclusions, or evidence. We reiterate that 
the trial judge has wide discretion in the 
division of marital property, and his find-
ings will not be disturbed by an appellate 
court unless the record shows a clear abuse 
of discretion. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated, in Pennon v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 
at 1082, that 
in regard to the matter of the sufficien-
cy of findings of fact, a substantial com-
pliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is sufficient, and findings of 
fact and conclusions of law will support a 
judgment, though they are very general, 
where they in most respects follow the 
allegation of the pleadings. Findings 
should be limited to the ultimate facts 
and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and 
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and 
the evidence to support the judgment, 
they will be regarded as sufficient, 
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though not as full and as complete as 
might be desired. 
However, "to detormine if equity ww dcme, 
we must hive before UB specific findings of 
fact pertinent to that issue." Jomt 
}<m TOO P i d 1072,1074 (Utah 1985); 
^oyfa 9. Boyi^ 735 P.2d 669t 671 (Utah 
OApp.1987). 
[12] In the present case, the trial court 
gpedfkadly found that ^ajt the time of the 
parties' agreement, and until the property 
was sold in January 1982, defendant held 
title to 62Vz% interest in the ranch through 
Royalty Investment Company. The ranch 
was sold for $250,000,00 in January 1982, 
indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $78r-
125.00, which is 31^5% of $250,000.00." It 
is the trial judge's prerogative, not an 
abuse of discretion, to choose to disbelieve 
defendant's explanation of this property in-
terest There was evidence in the record to 
support such a finding, which is sufficient 
to come within the guidelines outlined by 
Peanon and Jonei 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
award with respect to the Anderson Ranch 
V 
Defendant's final issue raised on appeal 
is whether plaintiff was estopped from de-
nying that he furnished an adequate ac-
counting. He alleges that he made an oral 
accounting to the law firm of Roe and 
Fowler and turned over to Roe and Fowler 
all the stock certificates in the parties' safe 
deposit box. Roe and Fowler later re-
turned some of these certificates to defend-
ant Defendant argues that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon express or implied 
representations that the accounting was 
satisfactory because defendant made no 
further demand for an accounting after 
this event However, the document which 
defendant received from Roe and Fowler 
when it returned the certificates was only 
an acknowledgement that the shares were 
delivered into his control as president of 
Owanah, rather than a release or exclusion 
of the shares from an eventual accounting. 
Further, plaintiff alleges that she was in 
continual contact with 
ing his failure to make 
had brought a 
ant to enforce the 
agreement 
she was 





[13,14] Estoppel arises when there » 
(1) a false representation or concealment of 
material facts; (2) made with knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of the facta; (3) 
made to a party who is without knowledge 
or the means of knowledge of the m l 
facts; (4) made with the intention that the 
representation be acted upon; and (5) the 
party to whom the representation was 
made relied or acted upon it to his preju-
dice. M f f t J M X l M f i t y t t 
P.2d731,734(1938); Jfotyant;Joanitf 
State Unit, 549 P.2d 695,697 (Utah 197J), 
See alto City of Mercer hknd t Sitik 
mann, 9 Washipp. 479,513 P.2d 80,82 
(1973). If any of these elements are mist-
ing, there can be no estoppel My t 
iftctonfc, 83 P.2d at 734. Further, estop-
pel cannot be inferred from facts of which 
the party to be estopped had no knowledge. 
Grwer v. Gorn, 23 Utah 2d 441,464 Pid 
598,602 (1910). 
[15] Estoppel is not applicable under 
the present facts. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ.. 
concur. 
(oforiwumitt) 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Robert HOLYOAK, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 868220-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 14,1987. 
STATE v. HOLYOAK Utah 7 9 1 
Oteai 70 PJd 791 (VtahAff. M7) 
Police, relying on information provided 
by a confidential informant, obtained a 
search warrant to search Holyoah premis-
es for cocaine, As a result of the search, 
they found a small plastic bag containing 
cocaine hidden under Hoiyoak's water bed. 
Prior to trial, Holyoak moved to suppress 
the admission of the cocaine on grounds 
that the confidential informant's veracity 
and basis of knowledge were inadequate, 
that corroboration of his information was 
defective, as was the police affidavit based 
on the informant's testimony, and, there-
Defendant was charged with posses- fore, that there was insufficient probable 
sion of cocaine. The District Court, Utah cause to issue the search warrant Holy-
County, Ray M. Harding, J., denied defend- oak moved alternatively for disclosure of 
ant's pretrial motion to suppress and al- the informant's identity or for the court to 
lowed introduction of cocaine into evidence mkA u in cmm "k*1 of *• 
and defendant was subsequently convicted. infonnant on ^ ^ *•* ^ w a s > » 
Defendant appealed. Hie Court of Ap- ^ M mf^m Mormi<but M 
peals, Garff, J., held that defendant failed the police officer had fabricated the affida-
to object to admissibility of cocaine evi- vit and had planted the cocame. 
A suppression hearing was held, and 
even though testimony indicated that some 
of the allegations in the police affidavit 
were false, the trial court denied all of 
Holyoak's motions. Regarding the motion 
to suppress, the trial court stated that the 
affidavit, viewed in its entirety, supported 
the issuance of the search warrant 
At trial, the cocaine was introduced into 
deuce at trial, and hence, could not raise 
issue on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
Criminal Law 01036.1(3) 
Defendant failed to object to admissi-
bility of cocaine evidence at trial, and 
hence, he could not raise on appeal issue 
challenging denial of motion to suppress, evidence. Holyoak did not object to its 
introduction, and was convicted by a jury 
of possession of cocaine. 
James G. Clark, Provo, for defendant fa appeal, Holyoak raises substantially 
and appellant the same issues as in the evidentiary hear 
David L Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., mg; (1) Should the cocaine obtained pursu-
Sandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen., for ant to the search warrant have been sup-
plaintiff and respondent pressed on grounds that there was no prob-
able cause to support the search warrant? 
(2) Alternatively, should the trial court 
have ordered disclosure of the identity of 
the confidential informant? (3) As a fur 
ther alternative to suppressing the evi-
dence or disclosing the identity of the infor-
mant, should the court have conducted an 
in camm interview of the informant? 
his conviction of possession of cocaine, a Our review of these questions, however, 
third degree felony, on the grounds that depends upon whether these issues were 
the trial court failed to suppress evidence preserved for appeaL Although Holyoak 
c^btaiaed from the execution of an allegedly moved to suppress the cocaine prior to tri-
defective search warrant al, he did not raise an objection at trial 
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
